This is to clarify the points my fellow blogger DD raised with regard to Subramanyam Swamy's article. First of all, one needs to understand the problem in Kashmir. Like every other state and many countries across the world, Kashmir too has always had a liberal/socialist/leftist political outfit on one end and one or more conservative/rightist/Islamist party on the other. This is true of many other Indian states as well with the Congress filling the role of the former and the BJP with its Hindutva slant taking up the latter space. Just as the BJP takes its inspiration from ancient Hindu texts and our sanatana dharma, the Kashmiri right takes its cue from the Islamist system. Kashmir has long enjoyed strong familial and religious ties with PoK and to some extent, Pakistani Punjab as well. Not surprisingly, the Kashmiri Islamists look towards the Pakistani system as their ideal model (That is one area where the Hindu/Sikh right in India differs from their Islamic counterparts. The Islamist ideologues see Islam as embodying a comprehensive system of governance which it is the duty of the ideal (Islamic) state to adopt as the shariah. In the Hindu predominant states of India, none of the Sangh organizations have any comparable alternative blueprint for governance. While the RSS/VHP/Bajrang Dal have sometimes suggested that they do not, in practice, accept some aspects of the Constitution, they have never offered a clear conceptual alternative to the system as a whole). The trouble is that this Islamist opposition has found it unable to operative within the four corners of a secular Indian constitution - they have come to believe that there is no place in our system to execute their agenda (This is again a point where the Hindu right and the Islamists diverge in their strategy. The BJP made its compromises early on - though the RSS has sought a Hindu Rashtra in the past, the BJP now swears by secularism. This was a strategic move to render themselves more broadly acceptable so as to promote their growth especially in those parts of the country where Hindus are a minority. Also, it was facilitated by the fact that unlike the Islamists, the Sangh did not have any declared alternative that it idealized - the notion of Ram Rajya is quite a nebulous one). A system that does not offer political space to a mainstream alternative is inherently unstable and finds it difficult to sustain its own survival without the periodic use of force. In other words, an absence of choice implies a freedom deficit and a situation somewhat analogous to countries with single party ruled regimes across the world. (By the way, it is this fundamental understanding of politics in pre-partition Muslim dominated states that made Indira Gandhi reject the idea of incorporating Bangladesh into the Indian Union following the Bangladesh war - the fact that there are now two established parties ruling that country alternatively, one outwardly more pro-India than the other, shows how correct that decision was).
First of all, it needs to be made clear that there is no military solution to the Kashmir problem. The military can at best contain the scope of the problem and protect us from a failure to solve it but is not an answer in itself. This is where Swamy is wrong. By ruling out negotiations and foreclosing political efforts, he will ensure that those who do not see eye-to-eye with the GoI are goaded into extreme measures. The consequences of such an extreme position are too harmful to contemplate. For one thing, such a position will effectively hand over the jehadis a victory - the Kashmiri separatists will no longer have to play a careful game of balancing their support for dialogue with sympathy for the terrorists; instead, the stance will force them to go over fully to their side. If the GoI compels Kashmiris to take a with-us-or-against-us, given the historic sentiments in the valley, the odds are that a majority including moderates and independents would choose to go against us. No one, not even Israel, despite being so powerful, takes such an extreme view that there will never be a Palestinian state - the possibility of a state in the future is always held out for the Palestinians provided various conditions of good conduct are fulfilled.
Secondly, there was an outwardly calm in the valley but there has never been genuine normalcy. Sheikh Abdullah was imprisoned off and on by Nehru and later by Indira Gandhi, there were intermittent riots on a couple of occasions and finally an accord in 1975. But the Sheikh was well aware that the only way to guarantee peace in his state was if Kashmir, India and Pakistan all agreed. This was also the reason Nehru dispatched Abdullah to Pakistan for talks shortly before his death.
Swamy predicts that Pakistan will be controlled by jehadis five years from now. The question is still open. People predicted the same thing five years ago when there was speculation about Musharraf's successor. For one thing, the Americans ensured who Musharraf's successor was going to be and are very likely going to have a prominent say in who succeeds Kayani. It is true that the Pakistan army has moved steadily towards the right since Zia-ul-Haq and many of its cadres share a common ideological perspective with the jehadi outfits. But this will affect more the answer to the questions when and whether the Kashmir issue is tackled, not so much how. As Pranab Mukherjee said recently, Pakistan will be judged by its actions, not words. If jehad is declared against India, that will of course automatically shut down the dialogue process as it had done recently following the Pakistan Army's direct role in the Embassy bombing in Kabul. No doubt we need to be prepared to wield the stick but that does not mean that if peace reigns, there can be no carrot. Besides, the ideological predilection of the army are no doubt important but it is one among several related factors to be figured into the political calculus. After all, we have dealt with the Islamist right before - for example, the Vajpayee government held discussions with Maulana Fazlur Rehman, a Deobandi cleric who heads the Jamiat-ulema-e-Islam and is currently the Pakistani parliament's chairperson on Kashmir affairs.
Finally, much has been written about the legalities of the dispute, so I will keep this brief. India promised a plebiscite in the Instrument of Accession, a promise it came to regret and reneged upon (it conducted a plebiscite in Junagadh where it was confident of victory given the large Hindu majority but none in Kashmir where it possibly predicted that the odds of losing were high). It has since been arguing that the issue of a plebiscite is between the GoI and the people of Kashmir with Pakistan having no say in the matter. As for the issue of Kashmir with Pakistan, it will be resolved by talks under the Shimla accord of 1972. This fine distinction ignores the political realities of Kashmir and ever since the current peace process picked up towards the end of Vajpayee's tenure, such legalisms have been less employed by both sides.
Swamy is right that outright secession is not the answer - it is politically untenable and constitutionally impermissible. But short of that, is there a solution to the Kashmir question that would grant enough autonomy and would also be acceptable to Pakistan? There have been some reports of the two sides having arrived at a framework. There was even an article last year in Outlook providing the details which I do not recall now. Nothing was announced however and not much has been heard of it ever since. Gen. Musharraf a while ago suggested that the answer would perhaps involve 'rendering the border irrelevant'. That may be a worthwhile goal but India would have to figure out how to go about preserving and protecting its interests in the valley, a challenge that is easier said than done.
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